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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Korea

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SUBJECT Daily Power Output of Major Hydroelectric Installations in North Korea

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SUPPLEMENT TO
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1. Presented below are figures on the average daily power output of major hydro-electric installations in North Korea for the month of May 1949. For purposes of comparison, estimates of the potential production and of the average daily production for the month of July 1945 are included.

Station	Potential Power Output - July 1945	Average Daily Power Output - July 1945	Average Daily Power Output - May 1949
Supung (124-56, 40-26)	700,000 KVA*	199,544 KVA	140,000** Max. KVA 110,000 Min. KVA
Hochon-gang (128-10, 40-44)	388,000 KVA	160,846 KVA	180,000 Max. KVA 160,000 Min. KVA
Fujon-gang (127-30, 41-06)	201,375 KVA	77,751 KVA	100,000 Max. KVA 90,000 Min. KVA
Changjin-gang (122-12, 40-46)	326,500 KVA	111,964 KVA	200,000 Max. KVA 180,000 Min. KVA
Hwachon-gang (127-42, 38-06)	60,000 KVA	45,000 KVA	20,000 Max. KVA 10,000 Min. KVA
Mt. Kumgang (Diamond (128-07,	13,570 KVA	8,000 KVA	5,000 KVA

2. By the end of the war the Japanese had almost completed facilities at Supung for daily production of 700,000 KVA from an estimated hydraulic potential of 2,386,400 KVA. By 15 August 1945 six of seven 100,000 KVA generators had been installed and one was on the ground awaiting installation. The Soviet army removed the generator which had not been installed and two others, leaving four for current use; these are rapidly deteriorating through lack of replacement parts and proper maintenance.

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3. There is a total demand of 270,000 KVA at the Hungnam Chemical Factory. Since 1946, 150,000 KVA have been provided for use in the electrical generation of steam, in addition to the 120,000 KVA allocated for general use.
4. Rumors of large-scale power transmission to Soviet areas have not been definitely confirmed. As far as can be determined, only a small quantity of electricity is being sent to the frontier zone between Hamgyong Pukto and the Maritime Province.

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Comment. The estimate of the total hydroelectric production in North Korea presented in this report approximates the figure reported by another American agency. It is suggested that the figures in [] were based on planned capacity rather than on current output. However, it is possible that even the more conservative estimates of this report are somewhat exaggerated, since production in the amounts estimated would indicate that there is no significant power problem in North Korea.

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Comment. This is a hypothetical figure which represents the planned potential power output. In July 1945 the equipment needed for a power output of 700,000 had not been installed. See paragraph 2.

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Comment. An estimated 70,000-80,000 KVA is directed to Manchuria.

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Comment. Assuming a 10 percent distribution loss, 580,500 KVA is maximum; 499,500 is minimum.

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